







How much of international trade costs can be mitigated through implementation of trade 
facilitation measures and policies? What measures and policies affect trade costs the most? This 
paper presents findings from an initial analysis of new non-tariff trade cost estimates and their 
determinants, based on a bilateral database of comprehensive trade cost maintained by ESCAP. 
Among the top trade facilitating economies are Malaysia, the United States, China, 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, with Japan and Germany following closely. The dominance of 
Asian countries in the ranking is fully consistent with the trade-led growth strategies of these 
economies and their emphasis on reducing international trade costs. The more detailed analysis of 
bilateral non-tariff policy-related trade costs further reveals that, while the trade costs of many 
developing countries with developed countries have remained roughly unchanged since 1996, 
their trade costs with other developing countries have often sharply decreased between 1996 and 
2007 – at least within ASEAN. 
Results of the non-tariff policy-related trade costs modeling exercise strongly suggest that 
improving port efficiency (liner shipping connectivity) and access to information and 
communication technology facilities is essential to reducing trade costs. Policies aimed at 
liberalizing logistics and information technology services and increasing competition among 
service providers should therefore be readily considered, with a view to maximizing efficiency at 
any given level of hard infrastructure development. Establishment of public-private partnerships 
to accelerate the development of the national IT and transport and logistics infrastructure may 
also be actively pursued. The econometric results also supports the view that, given limited 
resources available, focusing on improving the overall business environment may be often more 
effective in facilitating trade than implementing soft measures solely targeted at speeding up 
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Trade facilitation, broadly defined here as the reduction of (direct and indirect) trade 
costs, has become a priority for developing countries who seek to maintain their competitiveness. 
Indeed, international trade costs faced by developing countries remain high, including for intra-
regional trade. This is also the case in Asia, where trade facilitation performance varies greatly 
across subregions, as well as within countries in each subregion. As shown in table, 1, 
comprehensive costs of trade in goods range from 53% of value of goods for intraregional trade 
among Southeast Asian countries, to a prohibitive 282% for trade in goods between South and 
Central Asia countries. 
 
Table 1: Intra-regional Comprehensive Trade Costs (2007; Tariff Equivalent) 

















Intra Asian trade 
Southeast  Asia  53%           
South Asia  139%  138%           
East and North-
East Asia  141% 227%  113%         
North and 
Central Asia  280% 282%  204%  149%       
Extra Asian trade 
Australia-New-
Zealand  90% 168%  155%  329%  61%     
European 
Union  113%  139% 135%  166% 129% 59%   
North  America  109%  162% 122%  259% 130%  107%  50% 
Source: Duval and Utoktham (2010), Annex 3 (services-sector adjusted estimates). 
 
How much of international trade costs of goods can be mitigated through implementation 
of trade facilitation measures and policies? What measures and policies affect trade costs the 
most? Trade facilitation performance is affected by a wide range of factors. Some are inherent to 
the location, culture or history of the trading partners and may be difficult to address through 
policy, at least within a reasonable time frame. Others, such as the availability of logistics 
infrastructure and services, a favorable exchange rate, a conducive business environment, or 
transparent and streamlined border procedures, may be influenced by policy makers. This paper 
evaluates the overall importance of the component of international trade costs that is influenced 
by these other factors, and assesses the significance of a number of specific policy-related factors 
in reducing trade costs. 
 
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature on trade facilitation and 
trade costs. First, we present trade costs based on a measure that is both comprehensive and 
founded in micro-economic theory. In contrast, most of the available empirical research on trade 
costs is based on a specific subset of trade costs (e.g., transport costs) or on data from perception 
surveys. Second, we decompose our comprehensive trade costs into natural (time-invariant) and 
non-tariff policy-related trade cost estimates, the later providing a broad indicator of the level of 
bilateral trade facilitation performance. While these initial estimates will certainly need to be 
refined in future work, they provide new insights on potential to improve trade facilitation 
between partner countries. Finally, we estimate the direct effect of various trade facilitation 
measures and policies on trade costs. Past literature, analyzing the impact of trade facilitation has 
done so mainly by estimating the effect of various trade facilitation indicators on bilateral trade 
flows using extended gravity models (e.g., Wilson, Mann and Otsuki, 2004). Given that trade UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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facilitation measures and policies affect trade flows through reducing the cost of trade, our 
approach can reasonably be expected to yield more accurate results and understanding of what 
factors may be most important for policymakers to focus on. 
Methodology and Data 
 
Defining Comprehensive Trade Costs 
 
As shown by Jack, Meissner, and Novy (2008; 2009), gravity equations derived from the 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) trade model as well as other leading trade models such as the 
model with heterogeneous firms of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), can be solved for an expression 
of bilateral comprehensive trade costs. This bilateral measure of trade costs is truly 
comprehensive in the sense that it includes all additional costs involved in trading goods 
internationally with another partner (i.e. bilaterally) relative to those involved in trading goods 
intranationally (i.e., internally or domestically). It captures trade costs in its wider sense, 
including not only international transport costs and tariffs but also other trade cost components 
discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), such as costs associated with the use of different 
language and currencies. Direct and indirect costs associated with completing trade procedures or 
obtaining necessary information are also included. 
 
Following Chen and Novy (2009), such all-inclusive trade costs may be defined as 
follows: 
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where    τij denotes geometric average trade costs between country i and country j  
tij denotes international trade costs from country i to country j 
  tji denotes international trade costs from country j to country i 
  tii denotes intranational trade costs of country i 
  tjj denotes intranational trade costs of country j 
  xij denotes international trade flows from country i to country j 
  xji denotes international trade flows from country j to country i 
xii denotes intranational trade of country i 
xjj denotes intranational trade of country j 
  σ denotes elasticity of substitution between all goods
2 
 
According to this equation, trade costs are directly inferred from observable bilateral and 
intranational (domestic) trade data, showing how much more expensive bilateral international 
trade is relative to intranational trade. Intranational trade is ideally defined as gross output less 
export. However, since gross output data is not available for most developing countries in Asia, 
alternative measures are needed. Following Novy (2008) and others (e.g., Shepherd, 2010), we 
first define xii and xjj as gross domestic product (GDP) less export and apply equation (1) to 
calculate trade costs. In an effort to improve on previous studies, however, we call the resulting 
                                                 
1 As in Jack, Meissner, and Novy (2008), trade costs may be expressed in tariff-equivalent form, defined as 
TETij = Tij–1. See Annex 1 for the full derivation of trade cost from the micro-founded gravity equation of 
Anderson and van Wincoop. 
2 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for detailed discussion of elasticity of substitution between goods. 
For the purpose of comparing results to past literatures, this paper follows Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2004) and Novy (2008) by setting σ = 8.   UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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cost estimates “upper-bound” trade costs (
UB
ij  )
 3 and calculate “lower-bound” trade costs (
LB
ij  ) 
where xii and xjj is adjusted for the share of services in GDP.
4 Tij, referred to as “comprehensive 
trade costs” (CTC) in the rest of the paper, is then calculated as the simple average of the upper-
bound and lower-bound trade costs. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of GDP and Gross Output based trade cost of selected countries with 
the United States of America (in tariff-equivalent) 





Costs (CTC)  Novy (2009) 
United States  Canada  41  21  31  25 
 Germany  85  58  71  70 
 Japan  80  53  66  65 
 Korea  76  50  63  70 
 Mexico  47  27  37  33 
 United  Kingdom  88  61  74  63 
 
Table 2 provides a comparison between various trade cost calculated using GDP data and 
those calculated using gross output for selected developed economies by Novy (2008). Our CTC 
estimates are found to provide a better approximation of gross output based trade costs than 
simply using GDP based upper bounds trade costs. 
 
  Isolating Non-Tariff Policy-related Comprehensive Trade Costs 
 
As we are mainly interested in non-tariff barriers to trade in the context of trade 
facilitation, we start by removing import tariff from our bilateral measure of comprehensive trade 
cost to calculate a non-tariff comprehensive trade cost (
nt
ij T ). Following Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004), this is done by dividing geometric average trade cost Tij by (1+tariffij), where 
the tariff is the weighted average tariff rate of country i on imports from country j.
5 We then seek 
to remove the “natural” and essentially time-invariant factors affecting trade, which themselves 
may not be influenced  by policy.
6  
 
                                                 
3 Novy (2008) finds that the percentage change of trade costs over time using GDP in the calculation is 
similar to those computed with gross output. Novy (2008) also shows high correlation between gross output 
and GDP, which makes GDP as a proxy of gross output still theory consistent. Novy (2008) notes however 
that using GDP data overstates intranational trade and thus the level of trade costs because GDP includes 
(non-tradable) services. 
4  ) ( ii
for
ii x NS x
LB
ij 
 , where  NS is the average non-service sector share of GDP of countries in the income 
group to which country i belongs to. Income group definition follows that of the World Development 
Indicator database. The same applies to country j. 
5 CTC is an aggregate measure of import and export costs, such that the tariff of j on i are also included in 
it. Therefore, one could also have used the geometric average of the tariff imposed by each country in a 
given country-pair on each other (i.e., (tariffij*tariffji)
1/2), given that Tij is in theory influenced by tariffs 
imposed by both countries. By using only tariffij to arrive at our non-tariff measure of trade cost of country 
i with country j, we recognize the fact that country i has no direct influence on the tariff of country j. 
Overall, both approaches often yield nearly identical estimates, due to the fact that tariff typically account 
for only about 3-6% of comprehensive trade costs when expressed in tariff equivalent terms.  
6 The importance of these “exogenous” factors have been discussed extensively in the past. See for 
example, Rodrick et al. (2002). UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
 
  6
Based on the existing trade modeling literature, such factors include geographic distance 
between countries as well as cultural distance, such as the use of different languages.
7 Non-tariff 





ijt e DISTANCE T
      




DISTANCEij  is bilateral distance in kilometers 
CULTij  is a set of dummy variables of cultural distance, namely, CONTIG and 
COMLANG_OFF as defined in table 3. 
 




ijt CULT DISTANCE T         ) ( ) ln( ) ln( 2 1 0     (3) 
 
Equation (3) is estimated using ordinary least squares with reporter, partner and year fixed 
effects. The fixed-effect dummies broadly capture the characteristics (e.g., business environment, 
infrastructure, trade policies, etc.) of each reporter and partner countries. The model is estimated 
using a cross-country panel data of 92 countries covering the period 1988-2008 (see table 3). 
Definitions, sources and expected signs of all variables are presented in table 4. 
 
Table 3: Countries included in the data set 









North and Central 
Asia  South Pacific 
Middle East  Africa 
China 









































































































                                                 
7 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004): “The death of distance is exaggerated”; Chen and Novy (2009); Jack, 
Meissner, and Novy (2008). UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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Table 4: Definitions, Sources, Expected signs and Data Description Regression 
Variable Name 
(in STATA)  Source  Expected 
Sign  Description 
ln_ctc ESCAP/TID      Natural log of comprehensive trade costs CTC (
ij T ).  
ln_ctcxtariff ESCAP/TID      Natural log of non-tariff comprehensive trade costs ( nt
ij T ).
8 
ln_dist  CEPII  +  Natural log of geodesic distance, following the great circle 
formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important 
cities/agglomeration (dense of population) in kilometers between 
reporting country and its trade partner. 
contig  CEPII  -  Dummy variable indicating “1” if 2 countries are contiguous and 
“0” otherwise. 
comlang_off  CEPII  -  Dummy variable indicating “1” if 2 countries share official 
language and “0” otherwise. 
Notes: 
ESCAP/TID: ESCAP Trade and Investment Division maintains a trade cost database at: http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/tcdb.asp.  
CEPII:  French Research Center in International Economics (http://www.cepii.fr). 
 
Regression results of non-tariff comprehensive trade cost equation (3) are presented in 
Table 5. As shown in that table, the model is estimated for 4 different time periods, but we see no 
significant changes in the estimated coefficients or their individual significance over time. To 
further check the robustness of these results, additional models of trade costs were estimated, 
including one of comprehensive trade costs with tariff as an explanatory variable, as shown in 
Annex 2. They confirm the significance and stability of the coefficients. 
 










Variables             
ln_dist  0.174*** 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.180*** 
















  [-5.593] [-5.942] [-5.774] [-5.456] 
Constant  -0.925*** -1.036*** -1.257*** -0.803*** 
  [-10.75] [-21.21] [-20.36] [-11.24] 
      
Observations 61,500  19,633  9,797  9,836 
Adj. R-
squared  0.735 0.751 0.740 0.761 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1     
t-stat. in square brackets       
 
Referring to equation (2), non-tariff comprehensive trade costs may be decomposed into 
a “natural” bilateral trade cost component NC =
ij CULT
ij e DISTANCE
3 1   , and a non-tariff “policy” 
component such that PC
nt = T
nt/NC. The policy component – whose value is usually between 0 
                                                 
8 Trade-weighted effective import tariff data from WITS is used to calculate 
nt
ij T . Missing bilateral tariff data in a given year is 
replaced with tariff data from closest prior year so as to retain as many observations as possible. As shown in Annex 2, where results 
with and without use ofthe  prior-year tariff data are reported, this does not affect the regression results significantly. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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and 1 -  in effect mitigates the “natural” physical and language component – whose value is 
always above 1 and constant over time. By definition, PC
nt includes all trade costs other than 
tariff and natural costs. In particular, it includes all trade costs that can be affected by a country 
through non-tariff policies and measures, e.g. policies to improve logistics infrastructure and 
services, or simplification and automation of trade procedures, including related to meeting 
customs requirements and/or product quality standards. 
 
Isolating the policy component of trade cost makes it easier to compare how effective 
countries have been in implementing trade facilitation policies and measures with different 
partners, regardless of how close they are geographically or culturally. Indeed, comprehensive 
trade costs between USA and Canada are likely to be much lower than those between USA and 
Japan simply because the territories of USA and Canada are adjacent and they have strong 
cultural similarities. However, lower comprehensive trade costs do not necessarily mean that 
USA facilitates trade with Canada more than with Japan from a policy point of view. This can 
only be answered by looking at the policy component of trade cost, which we have tried to (albeit 
imperfectly) to isolate as explained above. 
 
Tariff Costs versus Non-Tariff Policy-Related Trade Costs 
 
When PC
nt is expressed in a tariff-equivalent form as pc
nt = PC
nt -1, it takes a negative 
value generally ranging from -40 to -70% in our sample of countries and years. The lower the 
value of PC
nt or pc
nt, the more “trade facilitating” a country is. As shown in Figure 1, the non-
tariff policy component pc
nt is large compared to tariff rates, which typically range from 3 to 9% 
in our sample. The figure highlights that the tariff cost, although a small part of comprehensive 
trade costs, have been significantly reduced between 1996-1999 and 2004-2007. The bilateral 
trade weighted-average effectively applied tariff rates of most countries were reduced during 
these two time periods to between 0 and 5%. The figure suggests relatively slower progress in 
addressing non-tariff issues, resulting in trade cost reduction of a similar absolute magnitude to 
those made through tariff cuts during the period, of about 3 to 6%. It also confirms that, although 
a significant part of overall trade cost reduction over the past 15 years may be attributed to tariff 
reduction, the scope for further reduction will depend on how effectively countries can tackle 
non-tariff policy-related costs.
9  
                                                 
9 New estimates of trade restrictiveness by Kee et al. (2009) also support this view.  UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
 
  9




















EU5-DEU EU5-EU5 EU5-FRA EU5-GBR















































JPN-NAFTA JPN-PHL JPN-THA JPN-USA
KOR-CHN
KOR-DEU

































































EU5-DEU EU5-EU5 EU5-FRA EU5-GBR















































































































































































JPN-GBR JPN-IDN JPN-IND JPN-KOR
JPN-MYS
























































































*Policy Component refers to bilateral non-tariff policy trade cost, expressed as tariff-equivalent. 
 
Non-Tariff Comprehensive Trade Costs: Overview and Ranking 
 
Table 6 shows the geometric average non-tariff comprehensive trade cost of selected 
countries, as well as their natural and policy-related decomposition over three different time 
periods.
10 The trade cost values should be interpreted as an index, with a higher value indicating 
higher cost – over time or compared to another country. Some countries with high average natural 
trade costs (e.g., the United States) are able to effectively mitigate these costs through effective 
domestic non-tariff trade-related policies and achieve low overall trade costs. Most countries are 
found to have reduced their non-tariff policy-related trade costs between 1996 and 2007, although 
they increased slightly in the Philippines and the United Kingdom; and stayed the same in India, 
Indonesia and the United States during that period. 
 
Malaysia, China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand not only have some of the lowest 
non-tariff policy-related trade costs in our sample on average, they are also among the countries 
which made the most progress in reducing their trade costs over the past 15 years. Among 
developed economies, Germany and Japan made substantial progress in trade facilitation, 
                                                 
10 These averages are illustrative only and calculated based on trade costs of each reporting country i with 
the following 12 countries and 2 regions: China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States; EU5 and NAFTA. Bilateral data is 
available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/tcdb.asp. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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achieving non-tariff comprehensive trade costs on par with those of the United States, ranked 
number one among developed country according to our non-tariff trade cost measure. 
 
Table 6: Average Non-Tariff Comprehensive Trade Cost of Selected Asian Countries  



























Malaysia  1.42 4.28  0.34 1.39 4.28  0.33  1.38  4.28  0.33 
China  1.66 4.22  0.40 1.58 4.22  0.38  1.53  4.22  0.37 
Korea,  Rep.  1.63 4.28  0.38 1.65 4.28  0.39  1.58  4.28  0.37 
Thailand  1.63 4.27  0.39 1.61 4.27  0.38  1.59  4.27  0.37 
United  States  1.71 4.85  0.36 1.71 4.85  0.36  1.71  4.85  0.36 
Germany  1.79 4.42  0.42 1.77 4.42  0.41  1.72  4.42  0.40 
Japan  1.77 4.39  0.41 1.75 4.39  0.40  1.72  4.39  0.39 
India  1.74 4.29  0.41 1.67 4.29  0.39  1.76  4.29  0.41 
Indonesia 1.83 4.45  0.41 1.85 4.45  0.42  1.83  4.45  0.41 
Philippines  1.79 4.25  0.42 1.81 4.25  0.43  1.84  4.25  0.43 
United 
Kingdom  1.85 4.35  0.44 1.86 4.35  0.44  1.89  4.35  0.45 
France  1.94 4.43  0.45 1.93 4.43  0.45  1.91  4.43  0.44 
 
The top 5 trade facilitating countries based on our non-tariff policy-related trade cost 
estimates are Malaysia, followed by the United States, China, Republic of Korea and Thailand.
11 
Japan and Germany follow closely. The dominance of Asian countries in the ranking, even when 
Singapore and Hong-Kong, China could not be included for technical reasons, is fully consistent 
with the trade-led growth strategies of these economies and their emphasis on reducing 
international trade costs as evidenced by other trade facilitation performance measurements – 
notably the Doing Business and Logistics Performance indicators of the World Bank. 
 
We construct an index of non-tariff trade cost performance using Japan’s own trade cost 
performance for the 1996-99 as the base.
12 This J-index measures how much cheaper/expensive it 
is for country i to trade with j relative to Japan’s own cost of trading with j in 1996-99. If Jijt 
exceeds 100, it is more expensive for country i to trade than for Japan. The same concept is 
applied to policy-related trade costs in order to see the evolution of the J-index over time. 
 
It is worth noting, that averages of bilateral trade costs are strongly affected by the set of 
partner countries considered – or for which data is available -, such that it is best to look at a 
country’s J-index or trade cost with a specific country to understand its performance – as shown 
in Annex 3 and 4. That said, table 7 gives an overview of the average J-index for selected 
countries.
13 Malaysia, China, Republic of Korea and Thailand are found to have a non-tariff trade 
cost advantage over Japan; and that cost advantage has been successfully maintained over time. 
Japan managed to bring its trade costs to the same level as those of the USA in 2004-2007, after 
starting out with higher non-tariff trade costs in the late 1990’s. Philippines, Indonesia and India, 
as well as European countries including Germany, all face higher trade costs than Japan for the 
sample of trading partners considered.  
                                                 
11 See Annex 3 for a ranking of countries based on their bilateral Non-Tariff Comprehensive and Non-
Tariff Policy-Related Trade Costs with Japan and other selected trade partners. 
12  100 / 1999 1996 , ,    j JPN ijt ijt T T J  
13 See footnote 7. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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Table 7: Overview of Non-Tariff CTC and PC J-index [Japan (1996-1999) = 100] 
1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2007 
 
CTC
nt J-Index  PC
nt J-Index  CTC
nt J-Index  PC
nt J-Index  CTC
nt J-Index  PC
nt J-Index 
Malaysia  79.85 83.84 77.97 81.77 77.17 80.56 
China  94.58 99.05 89.65 93.84 87.23 91.20 
Korea,  Rep.  91.73 94.70 93.65 96.56 89.75 92.51 
Thailand  93.43 97.14 91.76 95.55 90.63 94.22 
Japan  100.00  100.00  98.93 98.93 97.33 97.33 
United  States  97.46 87.62 97.17 87.36 97.35 87.56 
Germany  103.66 104.79 101.90 103.04  99.04  100.36 
India  102.29 104.62  96.93  99.00  102.11 104.53 
Indonesia  105.12 105.38 106.21 106.14 104.55 104.12 
Philippines  101.92 106.02 103.05 107.17 104.87 109.19 
United 
Kingdom  107.12 109.92 107.40 110.22 109.80 112.39 
France  112.57 113.35 112.20 112.90 111.36 112.22 
 
 
Box 1- Contribution of Natural Bilateral Barriers and  
Country Characteristics to Trade Costs 
 
The model suggest that physical distance is an important factor of trade costs, with a 10% 
increase in distance between partner countries implying a 1.73% increase in non-tariff trade costs. 
Having a common border with a partner country, or having a common language, both have a 
significant impact on trade cost and contribute to their reduction. 
 
Following Fields (2003), we can quantify the contribution of explanatory variables to total 








                
 
where   κh denote contribution (in percentage) of explanatory variable xh to trade costs Tijt 
βh denotes the partial regression of a coefficient of Tijt associated with xh 
 
Applying the above equation to our models and data, we find that physical distance explains 
about 20 to 21% of the variation in non-tariff trade costs. Contiguity of countries and common 
language explain an additional 1 to 1.5%. These time-invariant and policy-independent factors all 
together therefore account for nearly 23% of non-tariff trade costs across countries. Most 
interestingly, we find that behind- and at-the-border characteristics of member countries account 
for 51 to 55% of the variation in trade costs, and many of these characteristics may be reasonably 
expected to be affected through policy intervention. Results are summarized below, and available 
in more details in Annex 5. 
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Contribution of factors to variations in non-tariff policy trade costs
14 
 
F a c t o r s           C o n t r i b u t i o n  
D i s t a n c e           2 0 . 0   -   2 1 . 5 %  
Contiguity                 0.6  -  0.9% 
Common  official  language                0.4  -  0.6% 
Total - “natural” policy-independent factors          21.5 - 23.1% 
Reporter specific characteristics (importing country fixed effects)    21.7 - 24.2% 
Partner specific characteristics (exporting country fixed effects)    28.7 - 30.5% 
Total - reporter and partner specific  characteristics     51.3  -  54.6% 
Total variation explained by the Models (1 to 4)        73.5 - 76.5% 
Unexplained  variation  (Residual)       23.5  -  26.5% 
 
Non-Tariff Policy-Related Trade Costs of ASEAN Countries (1999-2007) 
 
Figure 2 shows the non-tariff policy component of trade costs in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand with thirteen of their main trading partners. Generally, the level of trade 
facilitation of the 4 Asian countries was highest in trade with developed countries in 1996/99. For 
example, non-tariff policy- related trade costs of Malaysia during this period were 20% higher 
with Malaysia than with the United States or Japan. In the two most recent time periods studied 
however, the level of trade facilitation of ASEAN countries when trading with each other and 
other developing countries consistently and significantly increased, while the level of trade 
facilitation with developed countries stagnated, or in some cases decreased. For example, while 
Indonesia’s policy-related trade costs decreased by 5% or more with Malaysia and Thailand since 
2001, those costs increased by 2 to 3% with the European Union and the North American Free 
Trade Area during the same period.
15 
 
Overall, Malaysia has the best trade facilitation performance of all 4 ASEAN countries, 
followed by Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. The four countries generally improved trade 
costs with each other and China the most, with good progress also made in improving trade 
facilitation with India and the Republic of Korea – except in the case of Philippines. 
 
Malaysia’s lowest bilateral non-tariff policy-related trade costs are with the United States 
and Japan, followed by Republic of Korea and Germany. Its non-tariff policy-related trade costs 
are highest with Indonesia and Thailand, although major progress has been made over the past 15 
years. Within ASEAN4, Malaysia is most successful in facilitating trade with Philippines, 
although no improvements were made between 2000-3 and 2004-7. Malaysia’s level of trade 
facilitation with India are noteworthy – at roughly the same level as with Thailand, particularly 
when compared with that of other ASEAN countries with India. 
 
Indonesia’s lowest bilateral non-tariff policy-related trade costs are with Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and the United States, although it seems to be rapidly reaching similar levels 
                                                 
14 Negative value of contribution is interpreted as no contribution to the variation of the dependent variable. 
See Fields (2003) for a detailed discussion. 
15  It is worth noting that these changes in non-tariff trade costs may be attributed to policy 
changes in Indonesia, in the partner country, or both. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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of policy-related trade costs with China. Its non-tariff policy-related trade costs are highest with 
the Philippines, with only limited progress made over the past 15 years. Trade facilitation levels 
of Indonesia with Thailand and Malaysia have increased over time and reached similar levels than 
those with European countries. Indonesia has made most progress in facilitating trade with 
Malaysia, Thailand and China. 
 
Thailand’s lowest bilateral non-tariff policy-related trade costs are with Japan and the 
United States, followed closely by those with China. Its policy-related trade costs with Malaysia 
are also low, on par with those with the main European countries and lower than with the 
Republic of Korea. Unlike the other 3 ASEAN countries considered here, Thailand’s policy-
related trade costs with the United States and Europe have not worsened significantly over the 
past 15 years. Its progress in trade facilitation with India is also striking, although Thailand-India 
policy-related trade costs remain high. 
 
The Philippines’ performance is clearly mixed. Its lowest bilateral non-tariff policy-
related trade costs are with Malaysia and the United States, but those are high compared to the 
other ASEAN countries. Levels of trade facilitation of Philippines have stagnated or worsened 
with all thirteen countries in Figure 2 but with China and Thailand. Policy-related trade costs with 
India are also strikingly high, both relative to the trade costs of other ASEAN countries with India 
and to the trade costs of the Philippines with other countries from the region. Some of these 
results warrant more detailed investigation to verify and explain them.
16 At the same time, there 
have been reports that trade procedures in the Philippines, after having improved in the late 1990s 
as computerization and automation initiatives were implemented, subsequently worsened.
17  
                                                 
16 Some of the reasons behind the lack of India-Philippines trade were discussed by Avrekha Sharma, 
Indian Ambassador to Philippines (see http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/oct/31inter.htm). India and the 
Philippines signed a bilateral trade agreement in 2007 to address some of these issues (see 
http://www.indiadaily.org/entry/india-philippines-sign-nine-agreements-to-boost-bilateral-trade/). 
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1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2007Non-Tariff Policy-Related Trade Costs of China, India, Japan, and Republic of Korea  
(1999-2007) 
 
It is interesting to compare trade costs of the largest economies in Asia, particularly since 
they are at different stages of development. China impressively managed to reduce its trade costs with 
all of the 13 partner economies considered in Figure 3 over the last 10 years. Japan did so with 9 of 
the economies, Republic of Korea with 6, and India with only 4 of them. 
 
Overall, China, Republic of Korea and Japan are found to have achieved similar levels of 
trade facilitation, with India lagging behind. India made most progress in reducing its trade costs with 
Indonesia and China. Figure 3 shows that the Republic of Korea has achieved a high level of trade 
facilitation with India compared with those achieved by both China and Japan. Non-tariff policy 
related trade costs between Japan and India have seen little improvements over the last 10 years, but 
those between China and India have decreased significantly.   






















































































































































































































1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2007Which Policies Affect Non-tariff Policy-related Trade Costs Most? 
 
As described earlier, we now have a measure of non-tariff policy-related trade costs. Based 
on Equation (2), that bilateral trade cost measure includes all costs related to factors other than 
bilateral cultural and physical distance between countries. In particular, it includes trade costs related 
to country-specific characteristics of importers and exporters, many of which can be influenced by a 
wide range of policies, notably those related to logistics and ICT infrastructure and services 
development, business environment, exchange rates, and including those affecting the cost of moving 
goods to and from the factory to the nearest sea port - including preparation of documents and inland 
transportation – and then onward to their final destination. In this section, we construct a simple 
model to test which of these policies may affect non-tariff policy-related trade costs the most. 
 
The following double-log model of non-tariff policy-related trade costs is specified: 
 
ijt jt jt jt jt jt
it it it it it
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where  
LSCIt    Liner shipping connectivity index (maximum value in 2004 = 100) 
INTNETt    Number of internet users per 100 inhabitants 
DOINGBIZt   Ease of Doing business indicators, which consist of  
CREDITINFit  Getting Credit: Depth of credit information index (0-6) 
DISCit    Protecting Investors: Extent of disclosure index (0-10) 
CONTit    Enforcing Contracts: Procedures (number of steps) 
MISALIGNt  Undervaluation (-) or overvaluation (+) of currency against US Dollar (1 + %) 
MCOSTit  Cost to import (from ship deck to warehouse; US$ per container) 
XCOSTjt   Cost to export (from factory to ship deck; US$ per container) 
 
The Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) is chosen as a proxy of trade infrastructure 
and services, since over 80% of international trade still takes place via sea ports (See Box 2). Inland 
transport and logistics services necessary to bring goods to or from the border or the sea port is 
modeled using the cost to import and cost to export indicators from the World Bank annual Doing 
Business Reports. These two variables also account for the cost of preparing the relevant trade 
documents and clearing Customs – therefore also covering trade facilitation in its most narrow sense. 
 
The quality and transparency of the business environment in both the importing and exporting 
countries are also included in the model, as an increasing number of studies have shown that they 
significantly affect trade flows. Building on prior work by Duval and Utoktham (2010b), indicators 




Given the growing importance of information and communication technologies in trade and 
trade facilitation, we also include the number of internet users in the model as a proxy of the 
availability and ease of access to such technologies.
19 Finally, taking into account the current debate 
on under- and overvaluation of currencies and their effect on international trade, we also include this 
                                                 
18 The choice and nature of these indicators are discussed in details in Duval and Utoktham (2010b). 
19 See the result of the Phase II ARTNeT study (ESCAP, 2010) for a discussion of the impact of information 
technology in trade facilitation on small and medium-sized enterprises. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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factor in the model (see Box 3). Definitions, data sources and expected signs of all variables are 
presented in table 8.  
 
Box 2- Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI): An Overview 
UNCTAD
20 has developed LSCI in order to reflect overall improvement in maritime 
connectivity of a country. The LSCI index is composed of the following five quantitative indicators: 
(a) number of ships providing services to and from a country, (b) combined TEU (20-foot equivalent 
unit: standard size container) carrying capacity of these ships, (c) number of services provided, (d) 
number of liner companies providing these services, and (e) maximum vessel size available in a 
country. These four indicators together provide a comprehensive view of the maritime services 
available, and the implied quality of the port infrastructure. Higher values of LSCI indicate better 
maritime connectivity and efficiency. 
The figure below show the evolution of the LSCI for selected Asia-Pacific and other world 
subregions from 2004 to 2009. East Asia, and China in particular, has the highest port connectivity, 
ahead of countries of the European Union and North America. East Asia also made the most 
improvements over the period considered. 
South-East Asia has achieved good port connectivity overall, although it remains 
significantly lower than East Asia on average due to the inclusion of Least Developed Countries. The 
largest economies in ASEAN indeed have better LSCI scores than many developed countries. In 
contrast, most South Asian economies still lag behind, although they have made significant 
improvements since 2004. Pacific islands countries together have the lowest liner shipping 
connectivity scores, with no improvements since 2004. 
It is worth noting that landlocked countries are not included in the subregional averages as 
they have no maritime services of their own – and therefore no LSCI score. 







Index (2004=100 for country w/ highest score)
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004  
Note: Asia-Pacific countries are classified as follows: (a) East Asia: China, including Hong Kong, Japan and 
Republic of Korea, (b) Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam, (c) South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, (d) Pacific Islands: Fiji, French Polynesia, 
Kiribati, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu. 
                                                 
20 The data can be found online in the World Development Indicator database maintained by the World Bank.  UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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Box 3- Estimating Exchange Rate Misalignment 
 
One of the basic concepts in international economics is that, in the long run, the exchange 
rate between two countries should really be the rate at which an identical basket of goods and services 
can be purchased for the same price in these two countries. One can therefore roughly estimate the 
undervaluation or overvaluation of a currency by measuring the difference between the actual 
exchange rate with the purchasing-power parity (PPP) estimates available in the Penn World Tables.
21  
 
The resulting exchange rate misalignment estimates suggest that most Asian developing 
country currencies were still significantly undervalued against the US dollars in 2007, although most 
of the region’s currencies had strengthened since 1999 (i.e., post Asian crisis). Among the selected 
Asian countries presented in the figure below, China, Pakistan and Sri Lanka had the most 
“undervalued” currencies as of 2007, while Hong Kong, China, Republic of Korea and Singapore 
were least “undervalued”. Japan and other developed countries in the figure have “overvalued” 
currencies against the US dollar as of 2007. 
 
Exchange rate misalignment: Estimates of currency over/under valuation against the United 




























1995 1999 2003 2007
 
*Calculated as (PPP-Exchange rate)/Exchange Rate 
Source: authors’s own calculations 
 
The model is estimated using ordinary least-square with time fixed effects using a panel data 
set of 92 countries for the period 2004-2007. A longer time period could not be used due to limited 
availability of data on regulatory and infrastructure indicators included in the model. To check the 
robustness of the results, the model was also run by (a) keeping the reporting country variables and 
replacing partner country variables by a partner dummy/fixed effect and (b) keeping the partner 
country variables and replacing the reporting country variables with a reporter dummy/fixed effect. 
Estimation results are presented in table 9. 
                                                 
21 The “Big Mac Index” reported regularly in The Economist is based on the same concept, but uses prices of 




Table 8: Modeling Non-Tariff Policy-related Trade Costs: Definitions, Data Sources, and 






Description and Brief Explanation 
ln_lsci  WB TI*  -  Natural log of liner shipping connectivity index (maximum value in 2004 = 100): The 
higher the LSCI, the better port connectivity, which implies lower trade costs. 
ln_internetusers
_per100ppl  
WB  TI*  -  Natural log of internet users (per 100 people): the more internet users, the better ICT 





-  Getting credit: depth of credit information index (0-6): the more credit information 





-  Protecting investors: extent of disclosure index (0-10): the more measures to protect 
investors (i.e., higher level of disclosure), the lower the risks, which implies lower trade 





+  Enforcing contracts: procedures (number of steps): the more steps and complicated the 





+/-  Natural log of undervaluation (-) or overvaluation (+) against USD, defined as 
ln(1+misalignment rate), where misalignment rate is defined as (PPP - nominal exchange 
rate)/(nominal exchange rate). PPP
22 is acquired from Penn World Table. A country with an 
overvalued currency against the US dollar, will tend to have higher trade costs, although the 
net effect is ambiguous – since the more overvalued the currency, the higher the export 
cost, but the lower the import cost. 
ln_ 
importcost_usd 
WB TI*  +  Natural log of Cost to import into country i (US$ per container): the higher the import cost, 
the higher trade costs. 
ln_ 
exportcost_usd 
WB TI*  +  Natural log of Cost to export from country j (US$ per container): the higher the export cost, 
the higher trade costs. 
 
* World Bank Trade Indicator Database, available at: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/wti/1a.asp ;  
** World Bank Doing Business Data, available at: www.doingbusiness.org  
 
                                                 
22 Purchasing power parity (PPP) is defined as “the number of currency units required to buy goods equivalent 
to what can be bought with one unit of the base country”. PPP in Penn World Table is calculated by the national 
currency value of GDP divided by the real value of GDP in international dollars. (Source: Penn World Table: 




Table 9: Coefficient estimates of factors affecting non-tariff policy-related trade costs 
Model: (a)  (b)  (c) 




Explanatory Variables     
ln_misalign1 0.111***  0.111***   
 [10.80]  [13.46]   
ln_lsci1 -0.0894***  -0.0897***   
 [-20.28]  [-24.13]   
ln_internetusers_per100ppl1 -0.0554***  -0.0622***   
 [-9.535]  [-13.14]   
getloan_creditinfo1 -0.0150***  -0.0157***  
 [-5.192]  [-6.333]   
investprotect_disclosure1 -0.00790***  -0.00806***   
 [-5.017]  [-6.501]   
contractenforce_steps1 0.00376***  0.00391***   
 [4.849]  [6.351]   
ln_importcost_usd1 0.0201**  0.0117   
 [2.143]  [1.586]   
ln_misalign2 0.0991***    0.0996*** 
 [9.509]    [11.71] 
ln_lsci2 -0.0977***    -0.0944*** 
 [-21.77]    [-24.69] 
ln_internetusers_per100ppl2 -0.0640***    -0.0700*** 
 [-10.98]    [-14.27] 
getloan_creditinfo2 -0.0251***  -0.0250*** 
 [-8.578]    [-9.660] 
investprotect_disclosure2 -0.00935***    -0.00931*** 
 [-5.885]    [-7.350] 
contractenforce_steps2 0.00410***    0.00428*** 
 [5.393]    [6.976] 
ln_exportcost_usd2 0.0242**   0.0151* 
 [2.432]    [1.774] 
Constant 0.0973  -0.302***  -0.343*** 
 [0.630]  [-4.976]  [-4.092] 
      
Observations 10,123  12,229  12,188 
R-squared  0.431 0.583 0.563 
Reporter FE  No  No  Yes 
Partner  FE  No Yes No 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered  SE  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.  R-squared  0.430 0.580 0.560 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
t-stat. in square brackets       
 
 
 UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
 
  22
The model performs reasonably well and can explain about half of the variations in the 
bilateral non-tariff policy-related trade costs in our sample. All the variables in the model are found to 
be significant and have the expected signs.
  23 The results suggest than bilateral trade costs are most 
elastic to the change in exchange rate misalignment to the US dollar of the currencies of either trade 
partners, followed closely by change in liner shipping connectivity. The impact on trade costs of a 
country increasing the number of its internet users by one percent is found to be half of what may be 
expected from a one percent increase in liner shipping connectivity. Similarly, the impact on trade 
costs of a country reducing its direct behind-the-border export costs is found to be half of what may 
be expected from a one percent increase in internet users. 
 
Variables with larger estimated (and statistically significant) coefficients in principle have 
more potential to change trade costs – in particular since they can be interpreted as elasticities in our 
double-log model. In practice, however, these coefficients alone are not enough to assess how a 
variable actually contributes to overall changes in trade costs in a given country –or sample of 
countries. Following Fields (2003), we therefore quantify the actual contribution of explanatory 









            
where   κh denote contribution (in percentage) of explanatory variable xh to PC
nt 
βh denotes the estimated coefficient associated with xh 
 
The estimated contributions are reported in table 10. We find that about 25% of the changes 
in non-tariff policy-related trade costs can be explained by the liner shipping connectivity index, i.e., 
by access to effective maritime services - and related port infrastructure. Liner shipping connectivity 
in the exporting country is also found to be generally more important than connectivity in the 
importing country in affecting bilateral trade costs in our sample. These results suggest that policies 
and measures aimed at developing these services should be given highest priority for implementation 
in those countries that want to reduce trade costs.  
 
Table 10: Contribution of each explanatory variable to the model 
                                                 
23  While coefficients of variables expressed in natural logarithm can readily be interpreted as elasticities, 
coefficients for other variables (i.e., in this model, the business environment variables) need to be interpreted in 
terms of a percentage change in the value of the bilateral trade cost index resulting from a one unit change in 
that variable. Using model (a) estimates, addition of one additional step to the contract enforcement procedure 
in one of the partner countries may increase the bilateral trade cost index by 0.003 to 0.004. On average, a 10% 
increase in the valuation of a currency against the US dollar of a given country only increase that country’s 
overall bilateral trade cost index by 0.9  to 1.1%. Similarly, a 10% increase in a country’s liner shipping 
connectivity index value reduces its trade cost index by 0.89 to 0.97%. 
 
Model: (a)  (b)  (c) 
Explanatory  variables:     
ln_misalign1  -
24 -   
ln_lsci1 10.58%  9.47%   
ln_internetusers_per100ppl1 3.91%  4.02%   
getloan_creditinfo1 1.63%  1.46%   
investprotect_disclosure1 1.45%  1.28%   
contractenforce_steps1 0.56%  0.55%   





The second most important factor identified in reducing trade costs, accounting for 10% of 
changes in non-tariff policy-related trade costs, is access and usage of information and 
communication technologies (ICT). In particular, the level of usage of the internet in the exporting 
country is found to account for 7% of bilateral trade cost changes. This implies that policies and 
measures aimed at enhancing ICT infrastructure and services – and their usage through, e.g., 
education – should receive special attention in countries that want to facilitate trade. These results are 
generally consistent with the results of Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2005), although IT services were 
identified as the most important trade facilitation factor affecting bilateral trade flows in that study - 
among the four they considered –, followed by port efficiency. 
 
The three indicators of behind-the-border business regulatory environment together also 
account for about 10% of the changes in non-tariff policy-related trade costs. Half of the trade cost 
effect is accounted for by the credit indicator, providing support for the prioritization of behind-the-
border policies and measures aimed at increasing the availability of trade finance, in particular 
through increasing transparency and availability of information on creditworthiness of exporters and 
trade partners. The importance of contract enforcement, while significant, is found to have a limited 
effect on trade costs. This is somewhat in contrast with the past gravity-based analyses, where 
improving contract enforcement was found to have an important effect on bilateral trade flows.
25 
 
Interestingly, the direct cost of moving goods from/to factory to/from ship deck, including 
inland transportation, customs clearance and preparing documents is significant but found to 
ultimately only account for 0.5% of the variation in non-tariff policy-related trade cost overall. While 
the direct cost indicator used here has been used as a proxy for trade facilitation in general in gravity 
model exercises – due to its high correlation with other trade facilitation indicators (including trade 
time) - it can only reasonably be interpreted as direct trade cost in our trade cost modeling exercise. In 
that context, this finding is not fully surprising as these costs have been found to account for less than 
1% of the value of goods in developing countries of the region.
26 The sample of countries on which 
our results are based also do not include landlocked countries, for which the cost of moving goods to 
or from a sea port located in a transit country can be extremely high. 
 
The contribution analysis presented in table 10 finally suggests that local currency under- and 
overvaluation against the US dollar does not contribute to the total variation of non-tariff policy-
                                                                                                                                                       
24 Following Fields (2003), negative contribution estimates are interpreted as no contribution. 
25 See Duval and Uthoktham (2010) for a brief review of that literature. 
26 See ARTNeT Working Papers No. 88, 89, 92, and 93 on improving regional trade procedures in various 
developing countries, December 2010 onward; available at www.artnetontrade.org. 
ln_misalign2  -  - 
ln_lsci2  14.33%  11.92% 
ln_internetusers_per100ppl2 7.40%    7.02% 
getloan_creditinfo2 4.31%    3.56% 
investprotect_disclosure2 2.18%    1.82% 
contractenforce_steps2 1.09%    1.02% 
ln_exportcost_usd2 0.27%    0.13% 
reporter fe      33.83% 
partner  fe   42.95%  
year fe  - - - 
Variation Explained by the Model  47.93%  59.83%  59.29% 
Residual  52.07% 40.17% 40.71% 
Total  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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related trade costs in our sample.
27 This may be explained by the fact that our trade cost measure is a 
highly aggregated measure of import and export costs - with currency overvaluation lowering import 
cost but increasing export cost for a given country -, as well as the fact that trade partners may be 
trading in local or other currencies. While this result primarily suggests that the trade cost measure 
used in this study is not well suited to analyzing the effect of exchange rates among countries, it also 
provides a useful reminder of the growing interdependence between imports and exports. Indeed, the 
significant and growing import content of exports, particularly in value-added manufactured goods, 
makes the net effect of a change in exchange rate on trade flows increasingly uncertain.
28 
 
In addition to the three model specifications reported here, a number of alternative models 
were estimated to check the robustness of the results, as well as to deepen our understanding of the 
initial results. Modeling non-tariff trade costs (by adding geographic and cultural distance variables to 
the model) and comprehensive trade costs (by also adding tariff to the trade cost model) confirmed 
the stability of the results presented here for the non-tariff policy-related trade costs.
29 Alternative 
explanatory variables were also used. Substituting LSCI by the World Bank Logistics Performance 
Index (LPI) – an index broader in scope than the LSCI and measuring the overall performance of 
logistics infrastructure and services in a country - did not significantly alter the results. Substituting 
the World Bank Doing Business  behind-the-border import/export cost variable by the its 
export/import time variable - or by the Customs Performance component of the LPI – did not change 
the result that behind-the-border time and cost of procedures had a significant effect but contributed 
to non-tariff policy-related trade cost changes of non-landlocked countries only on the margin. This 
later result is somewhat in contrast with a number of earlier gravity-based studies, who have 
attributed large potential bilateral trade gains to reduction in the time associated with behind-the-
border trade procedures. This may be explained in part by the fact that other factors – such as the ones 
included in this study – had been omitted from these studies.
30 
Conclusion, limitations and needs for future research 
Trade facilitation performance may be affected by a wide range of policies and government 
actions. A database of bilateral comprehensive trade costs developed by the ESCAP Trade and 
Investment Division was used to evaluate the evolution of non-tariff trade costs over time in Asia, as 
well as to examine the importance of various determinants on such costs. Although non-tariff trade 
costs account for most of trade costs between countries, tariff cuts accounted for a very significant 
portion of trade costs reduction between 1996-99 and 2004-07. The scope for further reduction in 
trade costs will clearly depend on how effectively countries can tackle non-tariff trade costs in the 
future, hence the importance of determining policy-related factors that made affect them. 
 
Non-tariff trade costs, as defined in our study, include costs that cannot be easily (or at all) 
influenced by policy changes, i.e., essentially the geographic distance between countries and cultural 
distances. These bilateral “natural” trade costs between trade partners are found to account for nearly 
one third of non-tariff trade costs explained by our model, roughly the same as each partner country-
                                                 
27 In other words, the covariance of our trade cost and currency misalignment indices is negative, suggesting 
that the two indices tend to change in opposite directions in our sample. 
28 Import content is difficult to calculate due to data constraints. However, evidence from Europe clearly point 
to significant increase in import contents (accounting for 42% of the export value, in the case of manufactured 
products). See Breda et al. (2008), or OECD (2006). See also ARTNeT Policy Brief No. 30, December 2010, by 
Shunli Yao on the relevance of import content for China processing exports. 
29 Results from modeling non-tariff trade costs (instead of its policy-related component) are shown in Annex 6. 
30 See for example, Djankov et al. (2008). Many of the trade facilitation, infrastructure and logistics indicators 
used simultaneously are often highly correlated with each other, making it hard to decisively attribute changes 
to one over another. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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specific characteristics – some of which may be altered by policy and trade facilitation measures. This 
clearly highlights their significance and the need for policy makers and development professionals to 
have realistic expectation with regard to the ability of countries with high natural trade costs to 
compete in the global markets for goods. 
 
Most countries are found to have reduced their non-tariff policy-related trade costs between 
1996 and 2007. Among the top trade facilitating economies are Malaysia, the United States, China, 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, with Japan and Germany following closely.
31 The dominance of 
Asian countries in the ranking is fully consistent with the trade-led growth strategies of these 
economies and their emphasis on reducing international trade costs. 
 
The more detailed analysis of bilateral non-tariff policy-related trade costs suggests that, 
although a developing country typically faced higher such costs when trading with another 
developing country than with the United States or Japan as of 2007, the trade costs of that developing 
country with these developed countries have remained roughly unchanged since 1996. In contrast, its 
trade costs with other developing countries have often sharply decreased. Assuming that this catch-up 
phenomenon continued in ASEAN along the same trend in 2008-10, non-tariff policy-related trade 
costs of middle-income ASEAN countries with each other are today very similar to those they face 
with developed countries. A closer look at the bilateral trade costs of large Asian economies revealed 
that China, Republic of Korea and Japan have achieved similar levels of trade facilitation, but that 
India has lagged behind. China impressively reduced its trade costs with all 13 partner economies 
examined in our study. Non-tariff policy-related trade costs between China and India decreased 
significantly over the past 10 years. 
 
The econometric analysis, aimed at determining which trade facilitation measures and 
policies could be most effective at reducing non-tariff policy-related trade costs, strongly suggest that 
improving port efficiency (liner shipping connectivity) and access to information and communication 
technology facilities are essential to reducing trade costs. This may be difficult to do in many 
developing countries, at least in the short-term, given the financial cost associated with the 
development of the required hard infrastructure. However, policies aimed at liberalizing logistics and 
information technology services and increasing competition among service providers should be 
readily considered, with a view to maximizing efficiency at any given level of hard infrastructure 
development. Establishment of public-private partnerships to accelerate the development of the 
national information technology transport and logistics infrastructure may also be actively pursued. 
The analysis also confirms that, given limited resources available, focusing on improving the overall 
business environment may be often more effective in facilitating trade than implementing soft 
measures solely targeted at speeding up movement of goods between factory and the port (or vice-
versa). Undervaluation of the local currency against the US dollar was found to generally have a 
significant and positive effect on trade costs, although additional analysis showed that the actual 
contribution of currency misalignment to variations in trade costs across country and time was 
negligible as it affected import and export costs in opposite ways. 
 
This study and the results and data presented are naturally subject to a number of limitations, 
some of which may be addressed in future research. First, the comprehensive bilateral trade cost 
measure presented in this study is by definition a highly aggregated measure. While we believe it has 
several advantages over other trade cost metrics available elsewhere – e.g., its theoretical foundation, 
its comprehensiveness, the fact that it is not based on perception data, and its availability at the 
bilateral level for many countries over time-, the fact that CTC is a composite of import and export 
costs that exist between two trading partners make interpretation of the raw measure difficult at 
                                                 




32 This trade cost measure may also be affected by the underlying composition of trade of each 
country, such that calculating sectoral-level trade costs may be needed in order to increase 
comparability of CTC across countries. Identifying alternatives to using GDP (as done here in the 
absence of gross output) and/or refining ways to adjust for the related measurement bias against 
countries with large service sectors should also be considered in future research. The possible 
inherent bias of the measure against countries with low internal trade costs also may deserve further 
attention. 
 
Second, non-tariff trade costs of a given country were derived from CTC by removing only 
the average import tariff of that country from CTC. Removing the geometric average of tariffs 
prevailing in the two countries for which the bilateral trade cost is calculated may be more consistent 
with the theoretical model on which CTC is based. Although we expect this would have only a minor 
impact on our trade cost estimates, future studies may adopt this alternate non-tariff trade cost 
specification.  
 
Third, alternative ways to decompose non-tariff trade costs into “natural” and non-tariff 
policy-related trade costs may need to be explored. Estimated non-tariff trade cost elasticities of 
geographic and cultural distance were used for the decomposition in this study, implicitly assuming 
that they remained constant for any given level of trade cost and distance. In addition, we calculated 
the non-tariff policy-related trade costs as the residual trade cost after removing costs associated with 
natural country-pair specific characteristics; The non-tariff policy-related trade cost could possibly be 
made even more policy-related by removing the natural country-specific characteristics, e.g., whether 
a country is or not landlocked. Both these issues should be addressed in future work to the extent 
possible. Decomposing CTC in various cost components can be expected to remain challenging but is 
essential to deriving policy relevant implications. 
 
Fourth, the econometric analysis presented here should be extended. Much more remains to 
be done in deepening our understanding of policy-related trade costs, by including additional or 
alternative explanatory variables to the trade cost models developed here, and by examining how 
these variables may contribute differently to trade costs across groups of countries or world regions. 
The results also do not directly apply to landlocked countries as data for some of the variables used to 
explain our aggregate measure of non-tariff policy-related trade costs were not available for these 
countries. 
 
Finally, much remains to be done in terms of understanding and making best use of the 
bilateral trade cost data generated as part of this study. The size of the dataset and issues related to 
missing data (where bilateral trade cost data for each country is available for different years and with 
different partners over time) make the meaningful presentation of aggregate data particularly 
challenging. A unique feature of the trade cost dataset is its bilateral nature, providing new insights on 
bilateral and intra-(sub)regional trade facilitation. As such, development of a user-friendly online 
interface to download bilateral trade cost profile of individual countries may be considered. 
  
In terms of the broader trade facilitation research agenda, the results highlighted the 
importance of logistics and information technology services regulation as important “soft 
infrastructure” issues. More research on how these sectors are regulated, and how they may 
best be liberalized in countries at various stages of development, is needed as part of the 
                                                 
32 Although this may have made interpretation more difficult, we also avoided presenting the trade cost data in 
tariff-equivalent form, as we feel that the tariff-equivalent estimates may be misleading if compared with 
estimates in other studies using even slightly different methodologies and assumptions. Comprehensive trade 
costs and related measures are most useful to compare evolution of trade cost over time or across countries. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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Annex 1 - Derivation of Trade Cost Equation 
 
Anderson and vanWincoop (2003) derived the micro-founded gravity equation with trade 






















x  (1) 
 
where xij denotes nominal exports from i to j; yi and yj denotes nominal income from country 
i and j respectively; y
w denotes world income; σ>1 denotes elasticity of substitution across goods; 
Пi and Pj denotes price index of country I and j respectively; tij denotes bilateral trade costs (as one 
plus ad valorem term). 
 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) defines Пi and Pj as multilateral resistance term as those 
price indices incorporate average trade barriers with all other trading partners. Novy (2009) 




















x  (2) 
 
where tii becomes intranational trade costs. 
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Multiply (1) and (4) together and get 
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Then, the product of bidirectional trade costs relative to the product of their intranational 

























Therefore, geometric average of bilateral trade costs is defined as  
 































T  (6) 
 
Tariff-equivalent term is done by deducting one from (6) and thus, 
 
1 1



































Annex 2 – Additional Regression Results for CTC and CTC
nt 
 
CTC was modeled using a standard tariff dataset downloaded from WITS, as well as using a modified 
version to reduce the number of missing values. Regression results for CTC
nt calculated using the 
tariff data with no missing value adjustment is also shown below (third column). 
 
Variable Name 
(in STATA)  Source  Expected 
Sign  Description 
ln_tariff_wa  WITS*  +  Natural log of  trade-weighted effective import tariff applied by reporter on partner 
ln_tariff_wa2  WITS  +  Natural log of trade-weighted effective import tariff applied by reporter on partner, 
with the application of preceding year data if current values are missing. 






Variables:  CTC CTC  CTC
nt 
       
ln_dist  0.169*** 0.177*** 0.174*** 
  [34.33] [37.12] [36.53] 
contig -0.0448**  -0.0609***  -0.0602*** 
  [-1.967] [-2.693] [-2.650] 
comlang_off  -0.0784*** -0.0781*** -0.0778*** 
  [-5.700] [-5.533] [-5.593] 
ln_tariff_wa 0.339***     
 [10.79]     
ln_tariff_wa2   0.195***   
   [7.896]   
Constant -0.122  -0.938***  -0.925*** 
  [-1.253] [-10.40] [-10.75] 
     
Observations 41,746 61,500 61,500 
R-squared  0.782 0.761 0.735 
Reporter  FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Partner  FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE  Country pair  Country pair  Country pair 
Adj.  R-squared  0.780 0.760 0.735 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
t-stat. in square brackets   
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Annex 3 - Ranking of Countries based on their bilateral Non-Tariff Comprehensive and Non-
Tariff Policy-Related Trade Costs with selected trade partners 
 
Non-Tariff Comprehensive Trade Cost Ranking  Non-tariff Policy-related Trade Cost Ranking 
with Japan  with China  with 
Germany 
with United 





 rank of:  2003  2007  2003  2007 2003 2007 2003 2007  2003  2007 2003 2007  2003  2007 2003 2007 
Malaysia 1  1  2  1  5 8 2 3  1  5  1  1  1  1  1  1 
China 3  2     10  10  5  5     2  2  9 12  3 3 
Thailand 2  3  3  4  20  26 7  7  12 11 3  5  2  2  4  4 
Vietnam 5  4  5  3  36 30 22 12  28  26 13  7  13  8  10  6 
Korea, Rep.  4  5  1  2  26 21  4  2  13 24 4 3  34 34 2  2 
Australia 7  6  9  9  48 48 24 32  6  9  10 10  4  7  14 17 
Indonesia 9  7  15  20 49 46 31 31  23  27 18 16  10  13 12 10 
Japan     4  5  37 36 10  8  18  21 12  8      6  5 
United States  8  8  6 7  23  24     2 1  9 9  3  4    
Oman 12  9  39  25 68 63 58 42  41  31 68 59  16  9  49 28 
Belgium 10  10  10 6 1 1  9 6  8  6  60  52 5  6 9 7 
Philippines 6  11  13  10 41 49 13 21  29  33 14 18  21  29  7  11 
Germany 11  12  8 8    12  10  7 8   8  11  13  8 
South Africa  22  13  20  14 33 28 32 28  10  7  6  4  11  3  24 19 
Chile 23  14  18  19 51 45 21 22  3  4  19 13  7  5  15 15 
Russian Federation  27  15  11  11 16 14 29 27  19  23 20 19  29  17 23 22 
Canada 15  16  16 17  45  42 3 1  11 10  21  22 12 14  52  50 
New Zealand  16  17  29  35 52 55 34 38  15  19 11 12  17  15 28 30 
Austria 19  18  25 24 6 4  30 24  22  20 40 39  19  18 32 20 
Netherlands 25  19  19 15 4 3  19 13  16  12 62 62  23  20 18 13 
France 20  20  22  22  9  9  20 20  17  15 51 54  18  19 20 18 
Mexico 18  21  17 27  34  41 1 4  9  13 8 15 15 16 5  9 
Pakistan 17  22  30  34 47 54 38 34  44  48 28 31  26  30 37 34 
India 13  23  7  12 22 33 11 19  27  35  7  14  22  31  8  14 
Hungary 26  24  26 23 3 5  28 33  24  18 17 20  24  23 27 33 
Ireland 14  25  31  33 14 19  6  11  25  30 39 38  14  21 16 24 
Brazil 24  26  21  16 32 29 15 18  5  3  5 6  6 10  11  12 
United Kingdom  21  27  27  28 13 13 16 17  20  22 47 48  20  24 30 31 
Switzerland 30  28  38  39  8  6  26 25  36  36 56 53  28  25 29 26 
Czech Republic  38  29  34 30 2 2  39 35  34  28 31 29  37  28 39 37 
Italy 28  30  28  26 12 12 23 26  21  17 26 24  25  26 22 25 
Finland 29  31  14  13 30 20 35 37  14  14 38 30  32  33 35 38 
Sweden 31  32  24  29 18 15 27 29  26  29 36 28  33  35 31 32 
Spain 32  33  36  31 15 16 36 36  30  25 27 25  31  32 40 39 
Israel 35  34  33  37 38 43 18 16  33  37 32 37  35  36 17 16 
Colombia 37  35  48  38 57 53 17 15  38  16 22 21  30  27 25 23 
Argentina 40  36  23  18 46 38 25 30  4  2  16  11 27 22  19  21 
Bangladesh 39  37  43  41 53 50 44 43  53  53 24 23  48  46 26 27 
Sri Lanka  33  38  53  56 59 58 42 45  60  58 35 32  39  44 21 29 
Norway 36  39  41  43 31 23 41 39  40  43 45 43  38  40 41 43 
Denmark 34  40  37  40 17 17 45 40  37  38 55 58  36  38 43 42 
Slovak Republic  46  41  45  32  7  7  47 46  43  32 23 26  47  37 47 47 
Kazakhstan 41  42  12  21 27 34 50 49  35  44 15 17  49  51 42 41 
Poland 48  43  40  36 11 11 46 44  39  34 37 34  51  43 45 44 
Maldives 42  44  68  65 67 65 51 63  68  67 64 50  42  45 36 59 
Malta 43  45  35  44 40 47 40 48  31  40 44 55  40  42 46 52 
Estonia 50  46  50  51 39 40 53 55  49  51 50 56  55  48 54 57 
Bahamas, The  57  47  67  67 54 59  8  9  66  65 25 36  56  41 44 48 
Dominican Republic  51  48  60  48 62 66 14 14  52  39 52 57  41  39 33 35 
Romania 49  49  32  46 19 25 43 47  32  46 29 33  50  47 38 46 UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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Non-Tariff Comprehensive Trade Cost Ranking  Non-tariff Policy-related Trade Cost Ranking 
with Japan  with China  with 
Germany 
with United 





 rank of:  2003  2007  2003  2007 2003 2007 2003 2007  2003  2007 2003 2007  2003  2007 2003 2007 
Turkey 44  50  42  42 29 27 37 41  42  42 30 27  46  49 34 36 
Azerbaijan 65  51  47  68 56 52 66 51  50  68 42 41  65  53 66 45 
Iceland 53  52  55  57 50 51 56 54  55  55 49 49  52  50 64 62 
Croatia 45  53  56  54 42 37 57 60  56  52 59 64  44  54 57 61 
Portugal 52  54  52  53 28 31 49 50  48  50 33 35  43  52 55 51 
Slovenia 54  55  49  50 21 18 48 52  46  49 43 42  53  57 50 49 
Cyprus 61  56  64  62 58 57 64 66  65  62 57 51  62  59 62 66 
Bulgaria 56  57  46  47 25 32 52 57  45  47 34 40  59  60 51 54 
Nicaragua 63  58  65  63 66 67 33 23  63  56 61 61  60  55 48 40 
Greece 47  59  54  55 44 39 54 58  54  54 46 46  45  61 53 53 
Mozambique 60  60  51  52 60 64 68 67  47  45 41 45  57  56 67 67 
Namibia 59  61  59  49 64 60 65 59  51  41 54 44  54  58 68 60 
Luxembourg 55  62  58  58 24 22 60 53  57  57 67 68  58  62 61 56 
Latvia 64  63  61  61 43 44 59 62  61  63 53 60  64  63 59 63 
Lithuania 58  64  57  60 35 35 55 56  58  61 48 47  61  64 56 55 
Armenia 66  65  66  59 63 61 62 65  67  60 65 65  66  66 60 65 
Moldova 67  66  62  66 55 56 63 64  62  66 58 63  67  65 63 64 
Georgia 68  67  63  64 61 62 61 61  64  64 63 66  68  67 58 58 
Kyrgyz Republic  62  68  44  45 65 68 67 68  59  59 66 67  63  68 65 68 
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Annex 4 - J-Index of Bilateral Non-tariff Comprehensive Trade Cost with Selected Countries (IJPN,j,1996-1999 = 100) 
 
The J-index scores presented below show whether the Non-tariff CTC of a reporter country with a given partner country – or its natural or policy-related 
component - are lower or higher than that of Japan with that same partner country during the period 1996-99. For example, the table shows that India trade cost with 
China were 15.52% higher than those between Japan and China in 1996-99. However, by 2004-2007, India-China trade costs were only 0.98% higher than Japan-China 
trade costs in 1996-99. Japan-China trade costs however decreased by about 10% between 1996-97 with the related index value falling from 100 to 89.3, indicating that 
India-China cost in 2004-07 are still significantly (at least 10%) higher than the Japan-China non-tariff trade costs. 
 
Reporter\Partner  Period  Data  IND CHN JPN KOR IDN MYS PHL THA DEU FRA GBR  USA  EU5 NAFTA 
India (IND)  1996-1999  CTC
nt     115.52     100.79  101.19  106.08  121.56  107.91  87.55  93.79  85.02  103.47  89.01  105.65 
      Natural     104.27    127.37  97.49  94.51  100.18  92.40  93.32  93.51  87.02  93.80  91.78  97.62 
      Policy-related (nt)     110.79    79.13  103.80  112.24  121.35  116.78  93.82  100.31  97.70  110.32  96.96  108.07 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt     106.60     103.49  86.38  86.90  114.25  103.37  89.39  93.67  80.11  105.11  88.64  104.64 
      Natural     104.27    127.37  97.49  94.51  100.18  92.40  93.32  93.51  87.02  93.80  91.78  97.62 
      Policy-related (nt)     102.24    81.25  88.61  91.95  114.05  111.87  95.80  100.17  92.06  112.06  96.49  106.83 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt     100.98     105.33  81.43  105.51  129.21  105.28  92.14  101.31  89.58  110.33  93.91  106.80 
      Natural     104.27    127.37  97.49  94.51  100.18  92.40  93.32  93.51  87.02  93.80  91.78  97.62 
      Policy-related (nt)     96.85    82.70  83.53  111.65  128.98  113.93  98.74  108.34  102.94  117.63  102.29  109.07 
China (CHN)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  95.79          84.75  101.30 98.35  110.71 94.66 85.60  89.15  93.82  91.72  89.04  92.68 
        Natural  87.35      96.76  98.22 89.34 99.12 94.40 96.98  97.15  97.26  100.22  97.09  100.77 
      Policy-related (nt)  109.67      87.59  103.13  110.09  111.69  100.28  88.27  91.76  96.46  91.52  91.70  91.81 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  88.30          83.08  97.89 93.00  100.98 87.14 80.08  86.77  89.20  90.07  86.11  89.92 
        Natural  87.35      96.76  98.22 89.34 99.12 94.40 96.98  97.15  97.26  100.22  97.09  100.77 
      Policy-related (nt)  101.09      85.87  99.67  104.10  101.88  92.31  82.57  89.31  91.71  89.87  88.67  89.16 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  77.21          80.31  98.73 89.34 94.53 88.55 77.68  85.36  89.88  90.72  84.64  88.08 
        Natural  87.35      96.76  98.22 89.34 99.12 94.40 96.98  97.15  97.26  100.22  97.09  100.77 
      Policy-related (nt)  88.40      83.00  100.52  100.00  95.37  93.81  80.10  87.86  92.42  90.52  87.17  87.37 
Japan (JPN)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  100.00 100.00      100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
        Natural  100.00 100.00    100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
        Policy-related  (nt)  100.00 100.00    100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  101.46 94.68      98.32  100.92 99.87 95.83 95.51 98.49  98.29  102.86  101.96  99.74  99.82 
        Natural  100.00 100.00    100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
        Policy-related  (nt) 101.46 94.68    98.32  100.92 99.87 95.83 95.51 98.49  98.29  102.86  101.96  99.74  99.83 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  97.07 89.30      94.45  100.75 99.81 97.31 91.56 95.75  97.74  104.15  102.80  99.01  99.07 
        Natural  100.00 100.00    100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
        Policy-related  (nt)  97.07 89.30    94.45  100.75 99.81 97.31 91.56 95.75  97.74  104.15  102.80  99.01  99.10 
Korea, Rep. (KOR)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  89.93 89.83          93.97 97.54 95.13 83.61 93.41  98.78  93.57  81.56  96.20  91.55 
        Natural  96.27 87.30      98.45 97.54 97.66 96.37 98.55  98.63  98.70  100.33  98.60  100.63 
      Policy-related (nt)  93.42  102.90      95.44  100.00  97.41  86.75  94.79  100.15  94.80  81.29  97.56  90.94 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  88.95 83.00          96.43 97.73 92.18 99.74 92.39  97.71  94.44  93.96  94.88  95.87 
        Natural  96.27 87.30      98.45 97.54 97.66 96.37 98.55  98.63  98.70  100.33  98.60  100.63 UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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      Policy-related (nt)  92.40  95.07      97.94  100.19  94.38  103.49  93.75  99.07  95.69  93.65  96.22  95.26 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  75.71 79.09          98.04 97.39 95.84 87.63 86.55  94.14  97.93  85.14  92.71  92.12 
        Natural  96.27 87.30      98.45 97.54 97.66 96.37 98.55  98.63  98.70  100.33  98.60  100.63 
        Policy-related  (nt)  78.64 90.60      99.58 99.85 98.14 90.93 87.82  95.45  99.22  84.86  94.02  91.54 
Indonesia (IDN)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  92.67  117.19     93.30     107.21  117.03  109.22  97.18 103.71 101.92 111.71 100.81  115.57 
      Natural  97.33  117.05    130.04    72.51  98.77  88.78  103.31  103.07  103.55  107.14  102.73  107.29 
      Policy-related (nt)  95.22  100.11    71.75    147.86  118.49  123.03  94.06  100.63  98.43  104.27  98.17  107.71 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  90.05 111.52      100.20      105.62 114.53 102.01 103.87  108.25  107.35  118.73  106.07  121.29 
      Natural  97.33  117.05    130.04    72.51  98.77  88.78  103.31  103.07  103.55  107.14  102.73  107.29 
      Policy-related (nt)  92.52  95.27    77.06    145.65  115.96  114.90  100.55  105.03  103.66  110.82  103.29  113.05 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  84.87  105.97     99.76     96.54  114.46  97.63  104.26 108.35 112.91 120.75 107.49  122.07 
      Natural  97.33  117.05    130.04    72.51  98.77  88.78  103.31  103.07  103.55  107.14  102.73  107.29 
      Policy-related (nt)  87.20  90.53    76.71    133.13  115.88  109.97  100.92  105.12  109.03  112.71  104.66  113.78 
Malaysia (MYS)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  70.51 91.44      80.37  85.02      83.19 79.00 76.40  77.20  73.13  82.21  79.18  86.15 
      Natural  93.00  104.94    127.00  71.48    96.71  74.48  101.39  101.23  101.71  105.90  100.90  106.40 
        Policy-related  (nt)  75.81  87.14   63.28 118.94   86.03  106.06  75.36  76.27  71.91  77.63  78.49  80.94 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  71.64 81.19      77.20  82.45      75.43 74.13 75.86  81.00  77.38  83.38  81.62  85.88 
      Natural  93.00  104.94    127.00  71.48    96.71  74.48  101.39  101.23  101.71  105.90  100.90  106.40 
        Policy-related  (nt)  77.03  77.36   60.79 115.36   78.00  99.53  74.82  80.02  76.08  78.73  80.89  80.71 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  65.54 76.83      76.55  75.56      79.54 70.65 75.57  83.79  82.85  84.82  83.13  85.83 
      Natural  93.00  104.94    127.00  71.48    96.71  74.48  101.39  101.23  101.71  105.90  100.90  106.40 
        Policy-related  (nt)  70.47  73.21   60.28 105.71   82.25  94.85  74.54  82.78  81.46  80.10  82.40  80.67 
Philippines (PHL)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  102.30  114.75     98.70 112.00  95.96     94.94  99.61 104.85  98.27  97.81 103.74  106.48 
      Natural  89.26  105.44    115.14  88.16  87.57    88.06  101.82  101.75  94.37  96.28  100.05  98.96 
      Policy-related (nt)  114.60  108.84    85.72  127.04  109.58    107.81  97.84  103.05  104.13  101.59  103.67  107.12 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  100.24  110.25     98.42 112.85  94.37     94.01  101.49 112.32 103.63 102.92 110.00  108.93 
      Natural  89.26  105.44    115.14  88.16  87.57    88.06  101.82  101.75  94.37  96.28  100.05  98.96 
      Policy-related (nt)  112.30  104.57    85.48  128.01  107.77    106.75  99.68  110.39  109.81  106.89  109.91  109.68 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  101.58  97.91     102.13 113.82  100.66     94.28  102.36 115.35 111.78 108.88 113.55  112.99 
      Natural  89.26  105.44    115.14  88.16  87.57    88.06  101.82  101.75  94.37  96.28  100.05  98.96 
      Policy-related (nt)  113.79  92.87    88.70  129.11  114.95    107.06  100.53  113.37  118.45  113.09  113.54  113.94 
Thailand (THA)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  92.26  102.92     96.75  90.82  88.66  94.18     88.25  95.01  87.12  98.35  90.83  102.06 
      Natural  88.69  108.16    122.39  85.36  72.65  94.86    99.56  99.51  99.95  104.42  99.23  105.07 
        Policy-related  (nt)  104.02  95.15   79.05 106.40  122.04  99.28   88.64  95.47  87.16  94.19  91.57  97.08 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  87.64 94.14      95.14  94.04 89.11 91.01      87.26  91.18  88.39  99.64  90.09  100.98 
      Natural  88.69  108.16    122.39  85.36  72.65  94.86    99.56  99.51  99.95  104.42  99.23  105.07 
        Policy-related  (nt)  98.81  87.04   77.74 110.17  122.66  95.94   87.64  91.62  88.44  95.43  90.80  96.07 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  82.52 88.49      95.47  91.46 86.02 90.04      89.13  93.38  89.42  100.34  91.26  100.33 
      Natural  88.69  108.16    122.39  85.36  72.65  94.86    99.56  99.51  99.95  104.42  99.23  105.07 
        Policy-related  (nt)  93.04  81.82   78.01 107.15  118.40  94.91   89.52  93.84  89.46  96.09  91.98  95.48 
Germany (DEU)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  91.64 112.53      112.18  110.77 113.63 116.74 116.14      75.79  80.80  106.39  77.96  103.23 
        Natural  101.10 125.42    141.26  112.11 111.62 123.79 112.38    55.16  59.96  90.36  63.95  92.89 UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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      Policy-related (nt)  90.65  89.72    79.42  98.80  101.80  94.30  103.35    137.39  134.76  117.74  123.12  111.05 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  91.83 105.32      110.51  115.98 113.09 113.38 111.48      73.91  79.58  103.97  76.31  101.18 
        Natural  101.10 125.42    141.26  112.11 111.62 123.79 112.38    55.16  59.96  90.36  63.95  92.89 
        Policy-related  (nt)  90.83  83.97   78.23 103.45  101.31  91.59  99.20   133.98 132.73 115.07 120.53  108.86 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  84.93  96.37     103.48 117.70  109.76  114.90  110.23     72.56  78.27 102.26  75.08  99.17 
        Natural  101.10 125.42    141.26  112.11 111.62 123.79 112.38    55.16  59.96  90.36  63.95  92.89 
        Policy-related  (nt)  84.01 76.84    73.26  104.98 98.33 92.82 98.09    131.54  130.54  113.17  118.56  106.75 
                            
France (FRA)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  102.04 121.76      124.47  124.05 123.71 131.94 123.11  80.44      82.05  112.08  77.24  109.83 
        Natural  102.10 126.62    142.48  112.72 112.31 124.67 113.20  55.59    56.27  89.84  59.92  90.21 
        Policy-related  (nt)  99.94  96.16    87.36  110.05 110.15 105.83 108.76 144.71    145.82  124.76  129.66  121.83 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  100.49 118.02      123.01  128.80 125.05 133.32 121.10  78.45      82.32  111.44  76.24  110.40 
        Natural  102.10 126.62    142.48  112.72 112.31 124.67 113.20  55.59    56.27  89.84  59.92  90.21 
        Policy-related  (nt)  98.42  93.21    86.33  114.26 111.35 106.94 106.98 141.11    146.31  124.04  128.00  122.42 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  93.66 110.23      120.16  130.16 127.00 137.48 121.17  77.01      83.80  112.93  76.43  111.42 
        Natural  102.10 126.62    142.48  112.72 112.31 124.67 113.20  55.59    56.27  89.84  59.92  90.21 
        Policy-related  (nt)  91.74  87.06    84.34  115.47 113.08 110.27 107.04 138.54    148.94  125.70  128.29  123.65 
United Kingdom (GBR)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  87.60 128.56      114.78  117.55 112.98 120.13 120.15  83.61  79.99      105.87  82.02  105.55 
        Natural  94.76 126.42    142.19  112.95 112.54 115.32 113.38  60.26  56.11    82.44  64.39  87.34 
        Policy-related  (nt)  92.45 101.70    80.72  104.08 100.39 104.18 105.97 138.74  142.54    128.43  128.36  120.33 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  88.30 118.38      116.94  123.63 119.01 119.67 117.93  82.35  80.25      107.52  81.78  105.14 
        Natural  94.76 126.42    142.19  112.95 112.54 115.32 113.38  60.26  56.11    82.44  64.39  87.34 
        Policy-related  (nt)  93.19  93.64    82.24  109.46 105.75 103.78 104.01 136.65  143.02    130.43  127.95  119.93 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  86.59 113.71      119.31  132.10 125.56 130.41 118.16  80.99  81.70      109.52  82.33  106.38 
        Natural  94.76 126.42    142.19  112.95 112.54 115.32 113.38  60.26  56.11    82.44  64.39  87.34 
        Policy-related  (nt)  91.38  89.95    83.91  116.96 111.57 113.09 104.21 134.40  145.59    132.86  128.78  121.48 
United States (USA)  1996-1999  CTC
nt  90.61 103.67      98.45  106.13 102.22  97.54 105.75  91.39  90.82  88.04      90.87  71.57 
        Natural  104.37 133.12    147.71  119.42 119.75 120.23 121.05  92.81  91.56  84.24      90.47  64.49 
        Policy-related  (nt)  86.81 77.87    66.65  88.87 85.36 81.12 87.35 98.48  99.20  104.50      100.52  114.88 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  90.43 100.81      99.37  110.37 102.23  96.21 103.60  89.05  90.40  89.23      90.80  72.22 
        Natural  104.37 133.12    147.71  119.42 119.75 120.23 121.05  92.81  91.56  84.24      90.47  64.49 
        Policy-related  (nt)  86.64 75.73    67.27  92.42 85.37 80.02 85.58 95.95  98.73  105.92      100.47  115.82 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  85.89  95.10     100.03 112.73  104.08  101.27  104.10  87.85  91.61  90.88     91.53  73.01 
        Natural  104.37 133.12    147.71  119.42 119.75 120.23 121.05  92.81  91.56  84.24      90.47  64.49 
        Policy-related  (nt)  82.29 71.44      67.72  94.39 86.91 84.23 86.00 94.65  100.05  107.88      101.29  117.08 
EU5 1996-1999  CTC
nt  98.16 125.07      122.09  120.14 125.36 132.52 125.74  83.29  77.74  84.69  113.91  79.90  109.61 
        Natural  100.41 126.80    142.72  112.58 112.18 122.84 113.11  64.57  60.04  64.69  88.95  65.34  91.04 
        Policy-related  (nt)  97.65  98.59    85.51  106.71 111.73 107.79 111.16 130.21  130.20  131.85  128.09  123.16  120.33 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  97.91 119.04      121.06  125.88 128.94 132.59 122.00  81.53  76.74  84.44  113.96  78.86  109.27 
        Natural  100.41 126.80    142.72  112.58 112.18 122.84 113.11  64.57  60.04  64.69  88.95  65.34  91.04 
        Policy-related  (nt)  97.42  93.83    84.79  111.81 114.92 107.84 107.84 127.47  128.53  131.44  128.18  121.55  119.97 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  91.79 110.87      118.32  129.36 128.69 137.56 120.55  80.21  76.93  85.01  114.51  78.72  109.27 UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division     Staff Working Paper 01/11 
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        Natural  100.41 126.80    142.72  112.58 112.18 122.84 113.11  64.57  60.04  64.69  88.95  65.34  91.04 
        Policy-related  (nt)  91.38  87.40    82.87  114.90 114.69 111.97 106.56 125.39  128.82  132.29  128.83  121.33  120.05 
NAFTA 1996-1999  CTC
nt  101.36 119.46      110.76  120.93 120.86 121.18 122.80  99.22  99.53  97.99  79.97  98.17  77.11 
        Natural  108.60 133.82    148.10  119.55 120.27 123.54 121.77  95.38  91.91  89.23  64.47  92.57  70.09 
        Policy-related  (nt)  93.17  89.18    74.76  101.13 100.44  97.78 100.80 104.06  108.54  109.70  129.04  106.17  112.61 
   2000-2003  CTC
nt  100.02 110.02      110.46  124.94 120.64 119.07 118.28  96.07  99.18  96.47  79.60  96.88  75.88 
        Natural  108.60 133.82    148.10  119.55 120.27 123.54 121.77  95.38  91.91  89.23  64.47  92.57  70.09 
      Policy-related (nt)  91.96  82.19    74.57  104.48  100.29  96.09  97.11  100.84  108.27  108.22  129.00  104.87  111.26 
   2004-2007  CTC
nt  94.92 104.26      110.90  128.88 122.05 124.62 119.47  97.46  103.72  101.65  84.95  100.64  79.38 
        Natural  108.60 133.82    148.10  119.55 120.27 123.54 121.77  95.38  91.91  89.23  64.47  92.57  70.09 
      Policy-related (nt)  87.41  77.89     74.87  107.78  101.44  100.64  98.07  102.18  113.00  113.71  136.22  108.79  115.84 
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 CTC  CTC
nt 
 1988-2008  1988-2008  2004-2007  2004-2005  2006-2007 
ln_dist  22.83% 22.17% 21.31% 20.18% 21.11% 21.53% 20.71% 
contig  0.67% 0.89% 0.66% 0.88% 0.79% 0.94% 0.64% 
comlang_off  0.56% 0.53% 0.56% 0.51% 0.52% 0.61% 0.44% 
tariff_wa  1.68%        
tariff_wa2    0.86%       
reporter  fe  22.11% 22.86% 20.80% 21.73% 22.91% 22.71% 24.23% 
partner  fe  30.50% 29.15% 32.88% 30.54% 29.98% 28.66% 30.44% 
Year effect  -0.21%  -0.34%  -0.30%  -0.30%  0.04%  0.02%  0.00% 
Variation explained 




partner fixed effect 
52.62%  52.01%  53.69%  52.27%  52.89%  51.36%  54.68% 
Residual  21.85% 23.89% 24.08% 26.46% 24.66% 25.54% 23.53% 
Total  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Observation 41,746  61,500  41,746*  61,500**  19,633  9,797  9,836 
   Note:   *   the model does not replace the missing tariff with the preceding year data 
        ** the model replaces the missing tariff data with the preceding year data 
 
 
                                                 
33 Negative value of contribution is interpreted as no contribution to the variation of the dependent variable. See Fields (2003) for a detailed 




Annex 6: Robustness Check of CTC












Explanatory  Variables:      
ln_dist  0.179*** 0.173*** 0.186*** 0.170*** 
  [32.63] [39.62] [40.47] [28.80] 
contig -0.0577**  -0.0975***  -0.0909***  -0.102*** 
  [-2.327] [-4.196] [-3.884] [-3.855] 
comlang_off -0.0925***  -0.0626***  -0.0214  -0.0153 
  [-5.942] [-4.277] [-1.407] [-0.894] 
ln_lsci1   -0.0892***  -0.0895*** 
   [-23.66]  [-20.18] 
ln_internetusers_per100ppl1   -0.0617***  -0.0540*** 
   [-13.04]  [-9.287] 
getloan_creditinfo1   -0.0156***  -0.0152*** 
   [-6.259]  [-5.300] 
investprotect_disclosure1   -0.00809***  -0.00824*** 
   [-6.470]  [-5.185] 
contractenforce_steps1   0.00395***  0.00392*** 
   [6.417]  [5.084] 
ln_misalign1   0.108***  0.107*** 
   [12.85]  [10.27] 
ln_importcost_usd1   0.0115    0.0179* 
   [1.555]  [1.917] 
ln_lsci2     -0.0955***  -0.0976*** 
     [-24.69]  [-21.61] 
ln_internetusers_per100ppl2     -0.0669***  -0.0623*** 
     [-13.70]  [-10.66] 
getloan_creditinfo2     -0.0260***  -0.0250*** 
     [-9.999]  [-8.575] 
investprotect_disclosure2     -0.00957***  -0.00952*** 
     [-7.485]  [-5.955] 
contractenforce_steps2     0.00436***  0.00423*** 
     [7.116]  [5.588] 
ln_misalign2     0.0986***  0.0942*** 
     [11.42]  [8.971] 
ln_exportcost_usd2     0.0124  0.0228** 
     [1.479]  [2.296] 
Constant -1.036***  -0.276***  -0.454***  0.173 
 [-21.21]  [-4.103]  [-5.196]  [1.108] 
      
Observations  19,633 12,229 12,188 10,123 
R-squared  0.753 0.666 0.651 0.552 
Reporter  FE  Yes No Yes No 
Partner FE  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE  Country pair  Country pair  Country pair  Country pair 
Adj.  R-squared  0.751 0.663 0.648 0.551 
Robust  in brackets         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
t-stat. in square brackets         